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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INDIGENT DEFENSE-ARKANSAS STAT-
UTORY FEE AND EXPENSE LIMITATIONS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Arnold v.
Kemp, 306 Ark. 294, 813 S.W.2d 770 (1991).
On November 30, 1990, the prosecuting attorney of Independence
County, Arkansas, charged Suzan A. Jernigan with the capital murder
of her husband and her mother.' The local circuit court determined
Jernigan was indigent and on December 11, 1990, appointed Blair Ar-
nold and Thomas E. Allen to represent Jernigan.2 Both Arnold and
Allen objected to the appointment, claiming the statutory fee and ex-
pense limitations for court-appointed counsel3 were unconstitutional.4
Counsel filed a motion on behalf of defendant asking that the Ar-
kansas fee cap statute be declared unconstitutional. 5 Additionally, the
attorneys filed motions for money to hire a forensic pathologist,6 a psy-
chiatrist,7 a chemical expert,' an investigator, 9 and an arson or fire ori-
I. Arnold v. Kemp, 306 Ark. 294, 295, 813 S.W.2d 770, 771 (1991).
2. Id.
3. ARK. CODE ANN. §16-92-108 (Michie 1987) provides in relevant part:
The amount allowed for investigation expenses shall not exceed one hundred dollars
($100), and the amount of the attorney's fee shall be not less than twenty-five dollars
($25.00) nor more than three hundred fifty dollars ($350).
The amount of attorney's fees for attorneys who defend indigents accused of capital
murder or murder in the first degree shall be not more than one thousand dollars
($1000).
4. 306 Ark. at 295-96, 813 S.W.2d at 771.
5. Appellant's Brief and Abstract at 11, Arnold v. Kemp, 306 Ark. 294, 813 S.W.2d 770
(1991) (No. 91-60).
6. Id. at 15. Counsel asked for $2000 in order to employ a forensic pathologist. Their reason
for requesting the funds was that the state medical examiner initially could not determine the
cause of death of the victims, but later amended his findings and stated that their deaths resulted
from homicide. Id.
7. Id. at 15-16. Counsel requested $1500 to be used to employ a psychiatrist to offer evi-
dence of mitigation and guilt. Id.
8. Id. at 17. Counsel believed that the State would introduce testimony at trial that Jerni-
gan used some kind of chemical for refinishing furniture to commit the arson. The Arkansas State
Police had taken three quart cans from the defendant's home and turned them over to the Arkan-
sas State Crime Lab for analysis. The lab was unable to find any identifiable volatile accelerants
which would be consistent with the expected testimony. Counsel requested $1500 to hire a chemi-
cal expert to inspect the same cans to determine if they contained clues to the possible origins of
the fire. Id.
9. Id. at 18. Defendant asked for $1000 to cover the expenses of hiring an investigator to
interview the possible witnesses located in both Arkansas and Texas. Id.
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gin expert. 0 Allen filed a motion for certification of attorneys' fees and
expenses, stating that as of February 20, 1991, he had incurred
$749.40 in out-of-pocket expenses and $2735.65 in office overhead."
Arnold also petitioned the court asking that he be justly compensated
for his time and requesting reasonable fees and out-of-pocket
expenses.12
In a letter opinion dated February 28, 1991, Circuit Judge John
Dan Kemp upheld the validity of the statute.1" The court relied on
State v. Ruiz14 to "reluctantly" find the statute constitutional.15 In an-
other letter opinion dated March 12, 1991, the court denied defend-
ant's motions for funds to hire a forensic pathologist, a chemist, and an
arson or fire origin expert. 16 The court ordered that the defendant be
provided psychiatric assistance and a psychological examination by the
Arkansas State Hospital as provided by statute.1 7 The court also
granted defendant funds in the amount of $10018 for the purpose of
hiring an investigator. The motion for attorneys' fees and expenses was
to be held until the attorneys' representation of defendant was
concluded.19
On March 14, 1991, Arnold and Allen advised the court that they
were refusing to proceed until funds to employ the requested experts
and investigators were provided. 20 Although they had challenged the
fee cap, the reason they gave for refusal to proceed was the narrower
issue of enforcement of the $100 expense cap.21 The circuit court held
10. Id. at 19. The state and its experts had been unable to determine the cause and origin of
the fire, although they insisted that defendant started the fire. Arnold and Allen asked for $1000
to employ an arson or fire origin expert. Id.
I1. Record at 130, Arnold (No. 91-60).
12. Id. at 148.
13. Appellant's Brief and Abstract at 110-12, Arnold (91-60).
14. 269 Ark. 331, 602 S.W.2d 625 (1980). The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-92-108 (Michie 1987) in State v. Ruiz.
15. Appellant's Brief and Abstract at 111-12, Arnold (No. 91-60).
16. Id. at 112.
17. Id. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-305(d) (Michie 1987) provides for an examination by the
Arkansas State Hospital of a defendant who intends to rely on the defense of mental disease or
defect when there is reason to believe that it will become an issue in the case. The United States
Supreme Court has held that when a defendant's sanity is likely to be an issue at trial, the Consti-
tution requires that the State provide the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist. Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
18. Appellant's Brief and Abstract at 114, Arnold (No. 91-60). See supra note 3 regarding
statutory limits on expenses.
19. Appellant's Brief and Abstract at 114, Arnold (No. 91-60).
20. 306 Ark. at 296, 813 S.W.2d at 771.
21. Id.
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them in contempt of court and fined them $1000 each.22 It also ordered
them to appear before the court on March 29, 1991, for further pro-
ceedings. 3 Arnold and Allen, on behalf of Jernigan as well as them-
selves, filed a notice of appeal and petitioned for a temporary writ of
prohibition and for permanent writs of prohibition, mandamus, and
certiorari.24 They asked for a stay of all proceedings against Jernigan
in the case in chief, a stay of enforcement of the contempt citations
against them, and a dismissal of the citations upon consideration of the
merits.25
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas vacated the contempt
citations and held that the fee and expense limitations imposed by the
Arkansas statute were unconstitutional. 26 Specifically, the court found
that the attorneys' rights to due process and equal protection were vio-
lated by requiring them to represent an indigent defendant for insuffi-
cient compensation.27 The court also invalidated the expense limitation,
the trial court's enforcement of which, strictly speaking, was the reason
the lawyers were held in contempt. 28 Arnold v. Kemp, 306 Ark. 294,
813 S.W.2d 770 (1991).
Within the context of uncompensated or undercompensated indi-
gent defense, there are several interrelated issues. The first is the right
of the indigent defendant to counsel. A second issue is the right of
counsel to compensation. Another related issue is the right of access to
funds necessary to provide a constitutionally adequate defense. The
court in Arnold v. Kemp addresses these issues in its invalidation of the
fee and expense caps.
The decision in Arnold v. Kemp represents the end of a long line
of challenges to Arkansas' indigent defense structure. 29 Although the
right of an indigent defendant to be represented by counsel was estab-
lished through a series of landmark United States Supreme Court
cases, 3° interestingly, that right has been recognized by statute in Ar-
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 304-06, 813 S.W.2d at 776-77.
27. Id. at 303-04, 813 S.W.2d at 775-76.
28. Id. at 304-06, 813 S.W.2d at 776-77.
29. See Coulter v. State, 304 Ark. 527, 804 S.W.2d 348 (1991); Pickens v. State, 301 Ark.
244, 783 S.W.2d 341 (1990); State v. Ruiz, 269 Ark. 331, 602 S.W.2d 625 (1980).
30. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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kansas since statehood.3 1
In Powell v. Alabama3" the Supreme Court held for the first time
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did apply in certain state
proceedings.33 The case involved the so-called "Scottsboro Boys," black
youths accused of rape, a capital offense in Alabama at the time. 34 The
Court stated that a denial of due process, within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 5 would result if the right to counsel did not
apply in this instance.36 The Court did limit its holding to cases in
which an indigent accused of a capital crime is incapable of adequately
providing his own defense because of ignorance, illiteracy, or some sim-
ilar deficiency.3 7 The Court declined to decide whether the right to
counsel would apply in other circumstances.38
In 1942 the Supreme Court held in Betts v. Brady39 that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not require the states
to appoint an attorney for an indigent defendant in every situation.4 °
Betts had been accused and convicted of robbery without provision of
requested counsel.41 The Court found that Betts had not been denied
due process; the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court said, only prohibits
conviction and incarceration of a defendant whose trial is "offensive to
the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right." '42 The Court
31. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-703 (Michie 1987), a descendent of Rev. Stat. Ch. 45 §
112.
32. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
33. Id. at 71.
34. Id. at 49-50. Alabama statutory law provided for appointment of counsel for indigent
defendants prosecuted for rape and murder. Id. at 48. The judge appointed the entire Alabama
Bar, but no specific attorney, to represent the defendants. Id, at 56. For a discussion of this fa-
mous case and the racial issues involved, see LAUGHLIN MCDONALD. RACIAL EQUALITY 131-33
(1977).
35. Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
US. CONST. amend. X1V, §1.
36. 287 U.S. at 71.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
40. Id. at 471.
41. Id. at 456. There was no statutory provision for appointment of counsel for this offense.
Id. at 457.
42. Id. at 473.
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held that Betts' trial did not meet that standard.4 3
In dissent, Justice Black argued that the Fourteenth Amendment
fully incorporates the Sixth Amendment and makes it applicable to the
states. 4" He argued that it was unfair to increase an innocent man's
chance of incarceration because of his poverty.4 5 Justice Black noted
that thirty-five states provided counsel, upon request, either by statute
or established practice, for indigent defendants accused of both capital
and serious noncapital crimes.46
Justice Black, along with Justice Douglas, continued to oppose the
use of the "fair trial" standard of Betts.47 From the mid-1950s, the
courts developed so many exceptions to Betts that by 1963 the excep-
tions had virtually swallowed the rule.48 Because of errors inherent in
any criminal proceeding and criminal defendants' lack of skills neces-
sary to provide an adequate defense, grounds for appellate reversal
could almost always be found.49 By 1963, only five states did not pro-
vide, either by statute or practice, for appointed counsel in noncapital
felony cases.5"
That same year, Gideon v. Wainwright5 overruled Betts v. Brady
and incorporated the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel into the
Fourteenth Amendment's right to due process, thus making the Sixth
Amendment applicable to the states. 52 The Court, with Justice Black
writing the majority opinion, stated that it agreed with the contention
in Betts that constitutional rights which are "fundamental and essential
to a fair trial" are imposed upon the states by the Fourteenth Amend-
43. Id. For a criticism of the Court's holding, see Yale Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and
the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 CHI.
L. REV. 1 (1962).
44. 316 U.S. at 474 (Black, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 477.
46. Id. at 477 n.2.
47. William Beaney, The Right to Counsel: Past, Present, and Future, 49 VA. L. REV.
1150, 1153 (1963).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Kamisar, supra note 43, at 19. The five states were Alabama, Florida, Mississippi,
North Carolina, and South Carolina.
51. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Gideon had been charged in Florida State Court with breaking
and entering with the intent to commit a misdemeanor. Gideon was indigent, and therefore re-
quested that counsel be appointed to represent him. The trial court denied his request, stating that
state law only allowed court appointment in capital offenses. Gideon was convicted and appealed,
claiming that his constitutional rights had been denied. Id. at 336-37.
52. Id. at 342.
1992] 599
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ment.53 Gideon differed by concluding that the Sixth Amendment's
right to counsel is indeed fundamental and essential to a fair trial, re-
gardless of the felony of which the defendant is accused.54
In that same term, the Supreme Court also determined that an
indigent's right to counsel extends to the first direct appeal of right.55
Nine years later, in Argersinger v. Hamlin,56 the Court extended the
indigent's right to counsel to include misdemeanors if a conviction
could result in incarceration."
Whether the Sixth Amendment guaranteed a right to effective as-
sistance of counsel or merely to have a lawyer present at trial, however,
was still unanswered.5" Several courts held that the Sixth Amendment
guaranteed only a right to have an attorney. 59 A common interpreta-
tion of the Court's discussion in Powell" of "effective" assistance of
counsel was that it set only a procedural standard, not a standard of
skill."'
In McMann v. Richardson2 the Supreme Court held that an indi-
gent defendant's right to assistance of counsel included the effective
assistance of counsel.63 However, in Strickland v. Washington,"' the
Court held that to warrant reversal in federal habeas corpus, the de-
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). This case involved two defendants who
were represented by a single public defender. The defendants dismissed the public defender,
claiming that he was unprepared. The defendants were convicted and denied appointment of coun-
sel on appeal. The Supreme Court held that this was a violation of the defendants' due process. Id.
at 354-58.
56. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
57. Id. at 37.
58. J.R. Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Convic-
tion Relief in Criminal Cases. 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 289, 293 (1964).
59. Id. at 293 n.19. See Hester v. United States, 303 F.2d 47 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 847 (1962); Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850
(1958): Miller v. Hudspeth, 176 F.2d II I(10th Cir. 1949); Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C.
Cir.). cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945); cf. United States ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976
(7th Cir. 1948).
60. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
61. Waltz, supra note 58, at 293. See also Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958). The court in Mitchell stated that effective appointment
of counsel did not refer to the quality of counsel appointed. Id. at 790. It is interesting to note that
former United States Supreme Court Justice Warren Burger was one of the three judges who
heard the case.
62. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
63. Id. at 771 & n.14.
64. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
600
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fendant must satisfy a two-prong cause and prejudice test.68  The
"4cause" prong is met by the demonstration that "in light of all the
circumstances . . . the identified acts or omissions were outside the
wide range of professionally competent assistance.""6 The "prejudice"
prong is met by the demonstration that "there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. ' 67 The
Court also applied the Strickland requirements to appeals of federal
convictions in United States v. Cronic.68
The historical notion that attorneys, as officers of the court, are
obligated to provide legal services to the indigent for little or no com-
pensation originated in the common law of England."9 Authority can be
found to both support7° and reject 7' the contention that American at-
torneys are under a similar professional obligation. Arkansas was one
of the last states to reject the obligation theory in light of current reali-
ties of criminal defense.72
In recent years, Arkansas has provided some payment for court-
appointed attorneys. Act 276 of 1953 provided that payments to court-
appointed attorneys would be no lower than $25 and no higher than
$250 in any county with a population not exceeding 100,000. 7' Act 125
of 1971 superseded Act 276 of 1953 to require all counties to compen-
sate court-appointed attorneys, but left the fee limitations in effect.74 In
the 1970s, the legislature enacted public defender legislation permitting
65. Id.
66. Id. at 690.
67. Id. at 694. A possible result of Strickland is that effective assistance of counsel may not
be required when there is a very strong case against the defendant, even though effective represen-
tation is most needed in such a case. See Richard Klein, The Emperor "Gideon" Has No Clothes:
The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS
CONST, L.Q. 625, 644-45 (1986).
68. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
69. David L. Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 735,
740-41 (1980). Shapiro offers a nontraditional view of this obligation as it actually existed in
England.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
978 (1966).
71. See, e.g., Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. I1 (1854).
72. Jeff Rosenzweig, The Crisis in Indigent Defense: An Arkansas Commentary, 44 ARK.
L. REV. 409, 417-18 (1991).
73. 1953 ARK. ACTS 276.
74. 1971 ARK. ACTS 125.
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certain counties to establish salaried public defenders.75 Act 246 of
1977 amended the Act by increasing the fee limitation on court-ap-
pointed attorneys to $350, depending upon the experience of the attor-
ney, the time and effort devoted to the case, and comparable fees
charged in the community. 76 This Act also provided for up to $100 for
investigative expenses.17 The statute was again amended in 1985 to al-
low for fees up to $1000 for representation of indigents in capital or
first degree murder prosecutions.78
Arkansas courts had upheld the constitutionality of requiring at-
torneys to provide services to the indigent for little or no compensation
since the late 1800s. 79 In the retrial of the well-publicized case of Paul
Ruiz and Earl Van Denton, the circuit court awarded attorney's fees
exceeding the statute's maximum, and the State appealed.8" In State v.
Ruiz,8" the Arkansas Supreme Court admitted that the statutory fee
provisions do not provide adequate compensation for the services per-
formed,82 but nevertheless upheld the constitutionality of the provi-
sions.8" The court based its ruling on the common-law obligation of
attorneys to serve the indigent, the strong presumption of constitution-
ality of legislative acts, the professional oath of the Arkansas Bar, 84
and the holding of United States v. Dillon. 5 In Dillon the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals determined that there was no common-law, stat-
utory, or constitutional authority requiring payment of fees to court-
appointed attorneys.8" The court in Dillon held that lawyers have an
obligation to provide services to the indigent, and to do so for little or
no fee was not a taking of property in violation of the federal Due
75. These provisions are codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-87-101 to 16-87-108 (Michie
1987).
76. 1977 ARK. ACTS 246.
77. Id.
78. This is the current statutory provision found in ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-92-108 (Michie
1987).
79. See Arkansas County v. Freeman & Johnson, 31 Ark. 266 (1876).
80. State v. Ruiz, 269 Ark. 331, 602 S.W.2d 625 (1980).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 333, 602 S.W.2d at 627.
83. Id. at 335, 602 S.W.2d at 627.
84. The oath states in relevant part:
I will never reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defense-
less or oppressed, or delay any man's cause for lucre or malice. SO HELP ME GOD.
Id. at 334, 602 S.W.2d at 627.
85. 269 Ark. at 333-35, 602 S.W.2d at 627. Dillon is found at 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
86. 345 F.2d at 636-38.
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Process Clause. 7
The constitutionality of the fee and expense caps in Arkansas was
again raised in Pickens v. State.88 Although the Arkansas Supreme
Court noted that other jurisdictions had recently declared comparable
statutes unconstitutional, the court stated that this was not the proper
case to reconsider the constitutionality of the fee caps because there
was no allegation of ineffective counsel, and the court determined that
counsel had not been forced to stay with the case for the retrial or
resentencing.89 Therefore, the court found no due process violation of
the attorney's rights and concluded that there was no indication the
indigent defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel as a
result of the statutory limitations.9"
In Coulter v. State9 the Arkansas Supreme Court again declined
an opportunity to hold the fee and expense caps unconstitutional.9 2 The
court stated that the defendant would have to demonstrate prejudice
had resulted from the fee and expense limitations. The court held that
Coulter did not do so." This decision resulted in a "catch-22" for de-
fense attorneys. Because the attorney must represent the defendant on
his first appeal of right, and because the court held in Ruiz94 that a
lawyer could be required to represent a defendant gratis, the attorney
must allege on appeal that he or she failed to do things because of lack
of compensation, thus admitting to an ethical violation.95 The court did
refer to recent decisions in other states holding comparable statutes un-
constitutional. 6 Once again the court said it would reconsider Ruiz97 in
the appropriate case.9 8
Despite the absence of the Coulter criteria that a defendant must
87. 346 F.2d at 638.
88. 301 Ark. 244, 783 S.W.2d 341 (1990).
89. Id. at 256, 783 S.W.2d at 348.
90. Id.
91. 304 Ark. 527, 804 S.W.2d 348 (1991). Coulter's lawyer was appointed from outside the
district because no one within the district would take the case. The lawyer spent his fee on a
defense expert that the court refused to compensate.-
92. Id. at 545, 804 S.W.2d at 358.
93. Id. For criticism of the Coulter decision see Rosenzweig, supra note 72.
94. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
95. Rosenzweig, supra note 72, at 419.
96. 304 Ark. at 542-45, 804 S.W.2d at 356-57.
97. 269 Ark. 331, 602 S.W.2d at 625 (1980).
98. 304 Ark. at 545, 804 S.W.2d at 358. In a concurring opinion, Justice Holt severely
criticized the statute and urged the legislature to address the issue of funding indigent defense. Id.
at 547. 804 S.W.2d at 359 (Holt, J., concurring).
19921
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prove prejudice, the Arkansas Supreme Court finally met the constitu-
tional issue squarely in Arnold v. Kemp.99 The appellants in Arnold
claimed that the statutory fee and expense caps violated the court-ap-
pointed attorneys' right to due process and that Arkansas' system of
appointing attorneys violated their right to equal protection. 100 Appel-
lants also alleged that the limitations resulted in a conflict of interest
between the attorney and the client and that by creating such limita-
tions, the General Assembly had invaded the province of the judicial
branch of the government."' The supreme court addressed only the
first two arguments.
Before discussing the due process issue, the court noted the strong
presumption that legislative enactments are constitutional and that the
benefit of any doubt must fall on the side of constitutionality." 2 The
court next discussed the reasons for its previous decision in State v.
Ruiz, which upheld the constitutionality of the fee cap.10 3 The court
noted that since the Ruiz decision, other states, including Alaska,10'
Florida,1"5 and Kansas, 06 had recently determined comparable fee and
expense caps to be unconstitutional.0 7
Writing for the court, 0 8 Chief Justice Holt followed the historical
analysis of the recent Kansas decision, State ex rel. Stephan v.
Smith, 0 9 which declared a similar statute 10 unconstitutional."' The
99. 306 Ark. 294, 813 S.W.2d at 770 (1991).
100. Id. at 296, 813 S.W.2d at 771-72.
101. Id. at 296-97, 813 S.W.2d at 772.
102. Id. at 297, 813 S.W.2d at 772.
103. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
104. DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1987). An attorney appealed
a contempt citation for refusing to accept a court appointment on the grounds that the statutory
fee cap was unconstitutional. The court held the statute unconstitutional as a taking of property in
violation of the state constitution. Id. at 443.
105. Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1986). The trial court awarded
appointed counsel fees in excess of the statutory cap and the county appealed. The court held that
the fee cap created a conflict between the rights of the indigent and the right to protect the
treasury and declared the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 1112-13.
106. State ex. rel. Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816 (Kan. 1987). Two judges entered gen-
eral orders establishing rules and panels for indigent defense that provided more compensation
than the statutory fee caps allowed. The state filed a petition for mandamus. The court deter-
mined that the fee cap, as applied, was an unconstitutional taking of property under the Fifth
Amendment and violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 842-46.
107. Arnold v. Kemp, 306 Ark. at 298, 813 S.W.2d at 772.
108. It should be noted that only two of the justices joined with Chief Justice Holt in all
reasoning. The remaining four justices disagreed with part of his reasoning or added their own
rationales in concurring opinions.
109. 747 P.2d 816 (Kan. 1987).
604 [Vol. 14:595
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Smith court looked to the English common law for the origin of the
obligation upon lawyers to provide legal services to the indigent for lit-
tle or no compensation."' The court in Smith observed that English
attorneys enjoyed special privileges that modern American attorneys do
not share.113 The Kansas Supreme Court concluded that attorneys have
an ethical obligation to provide services without compensation to the
indigent, but that the legal obligation to provide such services rests on
the state, not the individual attorneys.114 In addition, the Kansas court
analyzed the Fifth Amendment issues relating to fee and expense limi-
tations and concluded that a finding of a violation of due process de-
pends upon whether "property" has been taken and what kind of "pro-
cess" is due." 5
Relying on the analysis in Smith, the Arkansas Supreme Court
determined that the services of an attorney are property subject to
Fifth Amendment protection.11 ' Recognizing that the complexities of
criminal litigation and the skill required to provide effective assistance
of counsel have increased dramatically in recent years, the court held
that the burden imposed on Arnold and Allen by the appointment re-
sulted in a taking of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment and
a violation of article 2, section 22 of the Arkansas Constitution. 7
The court next addressed the equal protection issue. 8 Arnold and
Allen had argued that lawyers, as a classification, were not given equal
I10. The Kansas statute, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4507, provided compensation for court-
appointed attorneys pursuant to the regulations published by the State Board of Indigents' De-
fense Services. 747 P.2d at 824. Article 5 of the published regulations addressed compensation.
Appointed counsel were awarded $30 per hour for time spent on the case with the maximum
compensation of $400 if the case did not go to trial and $1000 if it went to trial. There was also a
provision for compensation of up to $5000 in exceptional cases. Id. at 826-27.
Ill. 306 Ark. at 298, 813 S.W.2d at 773.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 299, 813 S.W.2d at 773.
114. Id. The Kansas court stated that the source of the ethical responsibility was Canon 2
of the Code of Professional Responsibility: "A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in Ful-
filling its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available." 747 P.2d at 833.
115. Arnold v. Kemp, 306 Ark. at 300, 813 S.W.2d at 773. The Kansas court determined
that attorneys' services were analogous to merchants' goods since an attorney's advice is his or her
livelihood. 747 P.2d at 837. The court added that when attorneys are forced to spend their money
funding a defense, this is a taking of property in the form of money. Id. The court also noted that
appointing attorneys to represent the indigent does serve a legitimate, governmental purpose, and
therefore the statute is not unconstitutional on its face, but it is unconstitutional as applied. Id. at
838-42.
116. 306 Ark. at 302, 813 S.W.2d at 774.
117. Id. at 302-03, 813 S.W.2d at 774-75.
118. Id. at 303, 813 S.W.2d at 775.
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protection with other classes of professionals in that individual lawyers
were being required to fund society's obligation to provide legal defense
for indigents."' 9 The court noted that a classification must have a ra-
tional basis and be reasonably related to the purpose of the statute to
avoid a denial of equal protection. 120 To determine if the fee cap stat-
ute violated equal protection requirements, the court examined the
character of the classification, the individual interests asserted in sup-
port of the classification, and the governmental interests asserted in
support of the classification.121
At the time of the Arnold decision, twenty-six counties in Arkan-
sas had a public defender system and the remaining forty-nine counties
appointed private attorneys for indigent defendants. 22 Therefore, the
court determined, an attorney's geographic location determines whether
he or she may be required to provide services for the indigent.123 In
addition, an attorney's field of practice will also determine whether he
or she will be appointed. 24 These disparities place a burden of indigent
representation on a "subclass" of attorneys. 2 5 Thus, the fee and ex-
pense limitations violate the attorneys' right to equal protection.'2
The court then addressed the issue of how to compensate court-
appointed attorneys for the indigent. 2 7 The court held that the trial
court should not award fees based on the attorney's customary charges,
but instead should award fees that are "just.' 128 To determine what
constitutes "just" compensation, the court stated that trial courts
should use the factors set out in Chrisco v. Sun Industries, Inc.12 9
119. Id. The argument is often raised that other professionals, such as doctors and engi-
neers, are not forced to provide services to the public without compensation and it is no more
logical to require attorneys to provide public services for little or no compensation. See Sparks v.
Parker, 368 So. 2d 528, 534-35 (Ala. 1979) (Maddox, J., dissenting).
120. Arnold v. Kemp, 306 Ark. at 303, 813 S.W.2d at 775.
121. Id. (citing Holland v. Willis, 293 Ark. 518, 739 S.W.2d 529 (1987)).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 304, 813 S.W.2d at 775.
126. Id. at 304, 813 S.W.2d at 776.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 304-05, 813 S.W.2d at 776. Chrisco is found at 304 Ark. 227, 800 S.W.2d 717
(1990). Chrisco involved a breach of contract suit. The two parties settled, leaving only the issue
of the amount of attorneys' fees to award plaintiffs counsel. 304 Ark. at 228, 800 S.W.2d at 718.
The judge awarded $25,000.00 and plaintiff appealed the award. Id. at 228-20, 800 S.W.2d at
718. The court listed guidelines that should be used to determine an appropriate award of attor-
neys' fees. Id. at 229, 800 S.W.2d at 718-19.
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These factors include the experience and ability of the attorney, the
time and labor required to perform the legal service properly, the nov-
elty and difficulty of the issues involved, the fee customarily charged in
the locality for similar work, the time limitations, and the likelihood, if
apparent to the court, that the acceptance of the employment will pre-
clude other employment by the lawyer. 130
Additionally, the court in Arnold took guidance from, of all
places, the fee cap statute itself to determine what would constitute just
fees.' 3' Before the section imposed the caps, the statute had declared
that the court should determine an amount for a "reasonable and ade-
quate investigation" and that the fees provided for the attorney be
based on his or her experience, the time and effort involved, and com-
parable fees for the same service in the community.132 The court stated
that the factors provided by Chrisco and the statute should be "con-
servatively" applied by the trial courts.13 ' Additionally, the court deter-
mined that the $100 limit on expenses, which was the actual reason for
the attorneys' refusal to proceed, was too low and stated that trial
courts should approve reasonable expenses. 34
Although no one dissented from Chief Justice Holt's opinion, four
of the seven justices issued concurrences. All justices agreed that the
statutory fee and expense caps were unconstitutional. 35 However, Jus-
tice Dudley did not find a violation of Arnold's and Allen's due process
130. Chrisco v. Sun Indus., Inc., 304 Ark. at 229, 800 S.W.2d at 718-19.
131. Arnold v. Kemp, 306 Ark. at 305, 813 S.W.2d at 776.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 305, 813 S.W.2d at 776-77.
134. Id. at 306, 813 S.W.2d at 777. The expense cap had a checkered history in Arkansas.
Although the expense caps were not overruled until Arnold v. Kemp, many trial courts ignored the
caps and granted funds that exceeded the $100 expense cap. The Arkansas Supreme Court was
faced with several cases where the trial courts allowed funds which exceeded the cap, but did not
comment on the obvious disregard for the expense cap. In Simmons v. State, 278 Ark. 305, 645
S.W.2d 680 (1983), the defendant argued on appeal that the $200 allowed by the trial court for
investigation expenses in his capital murder trial was inadequate. The court stated that counsel
would have to show what defense might have been discovered in order to prove that the funds
were inadequate. Id. at 316, 645 S.W.2d at 686. The court did not comment on the fact that the
funds allowed exceeded the statutory limit. In Wainwright v. State, 302 Ark. 371, 790 S.W.2d
420 (1990). the trial court granted $840 for expenses. On appeal, the defendant asserted that the
trial court erred in refusing to grant additional funds for expenses. Again, the supreme court did
not comment on the trial court's disregard for the statutory cap, but only stated that it was not
error for the trial court to refuse additional funds. Id. at 379, 790 S.W.2d at 423.
The trial court's decision in Arnold v. Kemp to strictly enforce the statutory expense caps proba-
bly provided the catalyst for the Arkansas Supreme Court to confront the issue.
135. Arnold v. Kemp, 306 Ark. at 306-17, 813 S.W.2d at 777-83.
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rights and also disagreed with the "just compensation" standard."3 6 He
argued that the compulsion of an attorney to perform public service in
the form of representing indigents does not violate the lawyer's due
process rights and does not result in a taking of property. 137 Justice
Dudley based this argument on the role of an attorney as an officer of
the court. 3 8 He expressed concern as to the economic consequences of
the majority's holding. If attorneys are justly compensated at market
value, a financial crisis for the counties, and possibly the state, may
result. 13 9
Justice Newbern agreed with Chief Justice Holt that the statute
violated both equal protection and due process. 10 He speculated that
the issue of finances would be addressed by a statewide public defender
system."" Justice Glaze, joined by Justice Hays, questioned what Chief
Justice Holt meant by "just" fees.' 42 He argued that this part of Chief
Justice Holt's opinion is inconsistent with the Kansas decision, relied
upon so heavily in other respects of the opinion.'43 In Smith the Kansas
court held that attorneys should be paid at a rate which is "not confis-
catory, considering overhead and expenses."""' Justice Glaze argued
that the holding should be limited to providing compensation on the
same basis as that in the Kansas decision. 4" This, he reasoned, would
allow the General Assembly the flexibility to adopt a fee schedule simi-
lar to the one used in federal courts. 146
The concerns of the concurring justices are well-founded. The
court states that the factors listed in Chrisco should be used in deter-
mining appropriate fees. Chrisco, however, was a civil suit and the
plaintiff's attorney was to be awarded fees by the defendant. 47
136. Id. at 306, 813 S.W.2d at 777 (Dudley, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 308, 813 S.W.2d at 778 (Dudley, J., concurring).
138. Id. See United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 978 (1966).
139. 306 Ark. at 309, 813 S.W.2d at 779 (Dudley, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 313, 813 S.W.2d at 781 (Newbern, J., concurring).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 316, 813 S.W.2d at 782 (Glaze, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 316, 813 S.W.2d at 782-83.
144. 747 P.2d at 849. Another apparent difference is that the court in Arnold stated that
award amounts would be left to the discretion of the trial court, 306 Ark. at 305, 813 S.W.2d at
777, while the court in Smith stated that awards should not vary depending on the judge, but a
statewide scale should be used. 747 P.2d at 849.
145. 306 Ark. at 317, 813 S.W.2d at 783 (Glaze, J., concurring).
146. Id.
147. 304 Ark. at 228-29, 800 S.W.2d at 718. Many attorneys in civil practice charge well
over $100 an hour. If court-appointed defense attorneys are paid at a comparable rate, it could
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The financial consequences of the ruling of the Arkansas Supreme
Court declaring the statutory fee and expense limitations unconstitu-
tional will likely force the General Assembly to address the problem of
indigent defense in the state. There are four types of systems to choose
from in providing legal services to the indigent.' 8 One option is a pub-
lic defender system with salaried lawyers which is supported by public
funds.1" 9 A second alternative would be to have a private defender sys-
tem in which a nonprofit agency receives private donations as well as
public funds and contracts with the county or state to provide coun-
sel. 150 A third alternative would be a contract system in which private
attorneys would provide representation for all eligible defendants for a
set fee.' 5 ' Finally, the counties could continue to rely solely on court
appointments. Also at issue is whether the burden should be borne by
the state, the counties, or shared in some proportion.
The private defender system is probably not a realistic option for
Arkansas. This system is financed by private donations as well as pub-
lic funds. Arkansas is a small state with a relatively small population.
Dependence partially upon private donations, which would fluctuate de-
pending on the political climate and vary from year to year, would
make the system unreliable at best.
The contract system has the problems that would predictably re-
sult from awarding such a responsibility to the lowest bidder. In the
usual "contract" arrangement, office expenses, investigation, and some-
times experts, are paid out of the lump-sum fee. The less time and
money the lawyer spends on the case, the greater profit for him.' 52 De-
pending on how low the bid is, this system would be another form of
the disincentive so obvious in the fee cap. This breeds a conflict of in-
terest between attorney and client.
As a result of Arnold, the court-appointed system no longer has
the "advantage" of being low-cost. The application of the factors out-
lined in Arnold will probably be sufficient to limit appointments to con-
lead to financial crisis for the state as Justice Dudley suggests. 306 Ark at 309, 813 S.W.2d at 779
(Dudley, J., concurring).
148. Klein, supra note 67, at 656-57.
149. Klein, supra note 67, at 656-57. Twenty-six counties in Arkansas had a public de-
fender system at the time of the court's decision. Arnold v. Kemp, 306 Ark, at 303, 813 S.W.2d at
775.
150. Klein, supra note 67, at 657. The Legal Aid Society of New York City is an example
of this type of system. Id. at 657 n.180.
151. Klein, supra note 67, at 657.
152. Klein, supra note 67, at 679-80.
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flict cases involving multiple defendants. 63 However, even with com-
pensation increased to a constitutionally acceptable level it will still be
necessary to formulate standards for appointment of counsel. 154
Court appointment has not worked fairly with regard to indigent
defendants. Arkansas currently has no minimum standards for counsel
appointed to criminal cases. 55 Many attorneys appointed to represent
indigents in criminal cases are inexperienced or unfamiliar with crimi-
nal law and, therefore, unable to prepare an adequate defense. 5 '
A statewide public defender system seems to be the most logical
choice as a long-term solution. 57 Because of the experience factor, this
would lead to better representation for the indigent defendant. It also
now appears to be the least expensive method of handling indigent de-
fense because of the greater ability to control costs. However, one of
the other three methods must be used in connection with the public
defender system when conflicts involving the representation of multiple
defendants arise.
It is important that the legislature provide a standard of represen-
tation in addition to a standard of payment for indigent defense, no
matter which system is chosen.
Terri Schull
153. Conflicts of interest can arise when one attorney represents more than one defendant.
For example, each defendant may have a different defense or one defendant may blame the other.
154. Additionally, new problems would arise. If the county or state pays reasonable fees
with no cap, it would be difficult to monitor the requested fees and expenses, which could tempt
the attorney to defraud the state. See Shawn Hubler, Lawyer Asks for Court-Appointed Attorney,
Los ANGELES TIMEs, Aug. 15, 1991, at B1. A California attorney was indicted for billing the
county for indigent defense work that he never did. Within the last three years, the county paid
him $1.3 million. Id.
155. Jim Echols, Death Row Cases in Inexperienced Hands, ARKANSAS GAZETTE, Sept. 24,
1990, at BI. A 1985 bill providing for minimum standards for court-appointed counsel could not
find a sponsor in the legislature. Id. at B8.
156. Id. Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice for the Arkansas Supreme Court, offered a possible
explanation for this. He believes that younger attorneys have more time and since they are not yet
established, the appointment is less burdensome on them. He also alluded to the idea that being
appointed is a young lawyer's way of "paying dues."
157. See Arnold v. Kemp, 306 Ark. at 313-14, 813 S.W.2d at 781 (Newbern, J., concur-
ring). In response to Arnold v. Kemp, many counties in Arkansas have contracted with local
lawyers to provide indigent defense, generally for a fixed monthly, quarterly, or annual fee, out of
which the lawyer pays expenses. Some of these lawyers have the title "public defender." Tele-
phone interview with Sherry L. Daves, Office of the Attorney General, State of Arkansas (March
10. 1991).
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Author's Note
Jernigan prevailed on a motion to suppress the alleged confession.
The charges against Ms. Jernigan were subsequently dismissed on Feb-
ruary 10, 1992.

